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ABSTRACT 
The use of online forums and social media sites by extremists for recruiting and 
radicalising individuals has been covered extensively by researchers. Meanwhile, 
the social engineering techniques utilised by these extremists to lure marginalised 
individuals into radicalisation has been neglected. In this article, the social 
engineering aspects of online radicalisation will be explored.  
 
Specifically, the five Principles of Persuasion in Social Engineering (PPSE) will be 
mapped onto the online radicalisation methods employed by extremists online. 
Analysing these tactics will aid in gaining a deeper understanding of the process of 
indoctrination and of the psychology of both the attacker and the target of such 
attacks. This understanding has enabled the development of a preliminary 
radicalisation framework based on the social traits of a target that may be exploited 
during an attack. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Due to the increased use of the internet, the process of radicalisation has witnessed 
a noticeable shift from spreading propaganda and ideologies through physical 
institutions, to using internet forums and social media sites [1]. This strategic shift 
has granted extremists a perceived sense of anonymity [2], allowed them access to 
an increase audience size, and facilitated the act of like-minded individuals 
exchanging radical thoughts by utilizing the interactive features available in online 
platforms [3]. The use of numerous online platforms by extremists for recruitment 
and radicalisation and the creation of online detection and prevention methods 
have been covered in many studies [4], [5], [6]. What the research horizon is 
currently lacking is the in-depth analysis of the social engineering techniques 
harnessed by online extremists to radicalise individuals and how certain online 
medium features have facilitated this. This work includes a review of current 
literature and the development of a preliminary model. It starts with a brief 
overview of social engineering, followed by the listing of the Principles of 
Persuasion in Social Engineering (PPSE). A more detailed account of these 
principles will then be presented, along with the mapping of these persuasion 
tactics to the techniques used online by extremists. 
 
 
 
SOCIAL ENGINEERING OVERVIEW 
This report does not narrow the science of social engineering down to the context 
of information security; the cultural and psychological stratagems used by hackers 
to influence individuals to assist them in the unlawful access of computer systems 
and networks [7]. But rather, the science of social engineering referred to in this 
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report is the general term of manoeuvring individuals to performs acts that may or 
may not be in their best interest [8]. It is used in all human interactions, from 
children persuading their parents to yield to their demands, to politicians 
convincing their audience to vote for them. Social engineering attacks rely on 
human error and social psychology by exploiting behavioural and psychological 
weaknesses [9]. Such attacks are typically comprised of four major steps; 
“information gathering, relationship development, exploitation, and execution” 
[10].  
 
There are many social engineering principles used to influence and manipulate 
individuals. Over the years, researchers identified several techniques of influence 
and persuasion, the problem with these principles was that they were discipline-
bound and did not have clear common factors. In a recent paper, five independent 
principles were derived that effectively integrate these numerous principles, 
named the Principles of Persuasion in Social Engineering (PPSE) [11]. These 
principles are: 1. authority, 2. social proof, 3. liking, 4. commitment, reciprocation 
and consistency, 5. distraction.  
 
MAPPING SOCIAL ENGINEERING TACTICS TO ONLINE 
RADICALISATION TECHNIQUES 
When the aim of an extremist is to radicalise individuals and recruit members, a 
strong element of influence and persuasion is required to convince the target to 
make this drastic move. When applied, these tactics increase the likelihood of a 
target’s susceptibility to the attacker’s request. In the following sections, these 
principles of persuasion will be mapped to the corresponding documented 
behaviours performed by radicals online. 
 
Authority 
Authority plays a vital role in the acceptance of information. Information gained 
from an accredited figure of authority holds greater value than that from one of no 
authority. The reason for this is that humans are conditioned to respond to 
authoritative personalities without questioning their authority [9]. Figures of 
authority in certain disciplines gain this authority through a high level of 
knowledge and acumen in their field [12].  
 
Many studies have been conducted on the impact of the internet on authority, the 
role of religious authority and whether it affirms or threatens traditional, offline 
authority. Early research argued that the internet would pose a threat to religion 
and would result in “proliferation of misinformation and disinformation’’ and 
would lead to the ‘‘loss of control over religious materials’’ [13].  However, a more 
recent study on Christian blogs suggested that online religious authority may more 
often endorse traditional authority [14]. Regarding Islamic radicalisation, it has 
been reported that during the process of indoctrination of an individual, a religious 
authority that poses as a “spiritual sanctioner” is present, to smooth the process 
and increase the power of influence on the individual [15]. This view was 
confirmed in a recent report on the approaches used in Islamic State recruitment, 
where author Charlie Winter suggests that the recruitment of an individual into a 
terrorist organisation is not complete without the existence of an enlister that acts 
as the “provider of logistical information and humaniser of risk” [16]. Consequently, 
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it seems that the existence of such an authoritative figure may strongly increase the 
possibility of the target accepting the transition to extremism.  
Whether online extremist authority figures affirm or threaten traditional authority 
is a debatable issue. These online religious authorities that facilitate indoctrination 
believe themselves to be teaching the conservative and authentic interpretation of 
Islam, whereas they view more moderate authorities as teaching a diluted version 
of Islam [17]. Therefore, it may be concluded that online religious authority used in 
Islamic radicalisation affirms extremist interpretations of Islam, and threatens 
more moderate interpretations of it. 
 
Conformity or Social Proof 
Conformity is the psychological phenomenon of viewing a behaviour as acceptable 
if people in the group perform this behaviour. There are several implications of this 
principle. The first obvious implication is that once an individual begins interacting 
with extremists through online platforms, a gradual normalisation of the 
extremists’ radical ideologies and beliefs will occur [18].  
 
Secondly, in addition to the normalisation of extremist beliefs, opinions are 
amplified due to the concepts of homophily and group polarisation; which are the 
acts of like-minded individuals seeking each other out and exchanging similar 
opinions, resulting in the mutual reinforcement of views and attitudes [18].  
 
Thirdly, a problem with this principle lies in the situations where an individual is 
faced with unfamiliar situations, here their first instinct is to mirror the behaviour 
of those they believe are more enlightened than them. In the context of religious 
extremism, Choudhury [19] suggests that those that are drawn to extremism have 
poor religious knowledge and often do so as a result of an identity crisis [20]. The 
MI5 intelligence agency confirmed this theory in their findings of religious naivety 
as being a key vulnerability that would make a subject more likely to be affected by 
extremist ideologies [21]. Hence, if a subject is relatively naïve to religion, this may 
result in the subject copying surrounding extremists while justifying all violent acts 
due to his belief that these extremists lead the religious pathway. Examples of 
individuals that did not originate from strong religious backgrounds but found 
religion shortly before the time of indoctrination are the wave of Somali-Americans 
that left America in 2008 to join Al-Shabaab extremist organisation in Somalia [4]. 
Other examples include the Bastille Day truck attacker Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel 
[22] and Omar Mateen, the Orlando nightclub shooter [23], both of which were 
described by acquaintances as not being particularly religious.  
 
Finally, the criminology phenomenon known as “responsibility diffusion” dictates 
that an individual may feel less responsible for their actions if they are acting in a 
group [9]. This means that targets of online radicalisation attempts are led to 
believe that they are not solely accountable for any actions that may choose to 
perform within the group. This may help mitigate the risk the target feels towards 
joining and aiding a group in spreading its propaganda. 
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Liking 
The phenomenon of liking and being liked by another human being increases the 
likelihood of approving their requests and following their orders. Liking is also the 
first step towards building trust and confidence between two individuals. 
Moreover, this desire to create and maintain positive social bonds with other 
human beings is extremely critical as was demonstrated in a study that concluded 
that the threat of rejection causes neural reactions similar to those caused by 
physical pain [24]. 
  
Online extremists utilise this phenomenon by allowing socially deprived individuals 
to become part of their strongly tied community [3]. Marginalisation and the 
desperate need to belong have been identified by many researchers as being a 
primary trigger for online radicalisation [18], [25], [3]. This acceptance of a 
marginalised individual into a community may satisfy their fundamental need for 
belonging and contribute greatly to the target liking the attackers. Unlike charm, 
liking is a practiced skill that cannot be faked [8]. The attacker must have genuine 
feelings of admiration towards the target. This may strongly be the case in online 
extremism, where an individual must be approved and trusted to join the 
organisation and gain access to sensitive information.  
 
In another use of this phenomenon, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
claims that most extremists are recruited through their friends that have confirmed 
ties leading to the extremist group [26]. In this theory, the targets are not 
necessarily socially-deprived due to them having social relationships with 
individuals prior to their indoctrination, but the liking of these individuals that have 
ties to extremist groups facilitates their radicalisation. Nevertheless, the main 
weakness with this theory lies in the fact that many cases of targeted attacks and 
the grooming of individuals has also been reported by researchers [27], [28], [29]. 
Therefore, it may be concluded that the authoritative figure that facilitates the 
indoctrination of an individual as mentioned above, may be socially linked to the 
individual prior to the recruitment process, or may target the individual in an 
attempt to ‘groom’ them for radicalisation [16]. 
 
Commitment, Reciprocation and Consistency 
Commitment, reciprocation and consistency are important principles in influencing 
human action. Commitment is used by social engineers to pressure targets at hand 
to agree to a situation that they may or may not have agreed to with the absence of 
this influence [12]. Once a commitment is made by an individual, it is a natural 
process for that individual to attempt to remain consistent with the decision made. 
Accordingly, it is probable that an individual that agrees to become a part of an 
organisation will attempt to make his actions uniform with this decision.  
 
Reciprocation on the other hand is the mutual exchange of an act with an act of like-
value. Moreover, if this act were an act of kindness, the recipient of the act may feel 
the duty to repay it with a similar behaviour. By performing warm acts, as 
insignificant as they may seem, the receiver is immediately put at a disadvantage 
[30]. On the question of online radicalisation, allowing a disaffected, socially-
deprived individual to join an extremist community contributes to filling the urgent 
need to belong that the individual had failed to achieve with their physical 
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surroundings. Thus, this action may carry strong sentimental value for the target 
and may be interpreted as an act of kindness that must be reciprocated.  
This reciprocation may then take varying forms, ranging from spreading the 
extremist groups’ ideology and seeking out new recruits, to the most severe form 
being the planning and execution of an act of violence. The individual’s conscience 
decision to join the extremist community and adapt their ideology is a substantial 
commitment, various forms of reciprocation that follow afterwards may be the 
individuals attempts to demonstrate consistency. 
The consistency referred to in previous literature is the consistency of the target of 
the social engineering attack after making a commitment to the attacker, as is 
explained above. However, seeing as this paper is focussed on extremists’ online 
presence, the consistency of the attacker is also an important asset that may 
increase the chances of the attack succeeding. The consistency of the attacker may 
be achieved through regular online posts and updates that contribute greatly to 
maintaining the message being delivered and establishing the reputation of the 
attacker. With the current size of data being posted online daily, this consistency is 
essential for any online profile to stay relevant. This frequency of updates is a 
visible feature seen in online platforms used by prominent Islamic extremist groups 
and helps the groups form their reputations and maintain recognition [3].   
 
Distraction 
Distraction is accomplished by creating strong emotional responses that intensify 
the emotional state of the individual. This can be achieved by focussing the target’s 
attention on one thing to cause them to overlook another; this focus may be upon 
something the target is in desperate need of, or something that is scarce, or has 
been censored or restricted [11]. If the distraction is strong enough, it may cause 
the distortion of logical facts the target once acknowledged and may even cause the 
target to alter their entire belief system and moral standards [8], [16].  
 
One of the methods in which radicals may achieve this distraction is through their 
frequent posts on online platforms. The social media platform, YouTube, is the most 
common platform for spreading radical ideas [31]. This is most likely due to the 
graphical content exhibited in many radical videos, and the impact of the 
visualisation of such content on the emotional state of an individual. Examples of 
online posts by Islamic extremists that accomplish this distraction are news about 
conflict-driven areas, reports about discriminatory attacks against Muslims and 
stories of the groups’ victories [3]. Such content may evoke a wide range of 
emotions, such as the feeling of moral duty and obligation to defending one’s 
religion; obligation was identified as a key influence tactic [8]. Distraction could 
also be exhibited by consuming the target with the concept of the Muslim 
community being a “disenfranchised youth” that belongs to an out-group [25], and 
emphasising the concept of not belonging to the host society [31], causing an 
identity crisis within the individual. Consequently, these distractions may possess 
the power to manipulate the individual into joining a radical group while 
overlooking their unfounded ideology.  
From the above, it was concluded that each of the Principles of Persuasion in Social 
Engineering (PPSE) may be mapped to a prominent social trait in the target 
exploited by the principle. Figure 1. depicts a preliminary model of the process of 
radicalisation based on this mapping. The authority tactic was found to link with 
the social trait of compliance, seeing as the more compliant an individual is, the 
more receptive the individual may be to self-proclaimed figures of authority. From 
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the reviewed literature [19], [20], social proof/conformity was found to be 
associated mainly with the naivety of a target in unfamiliar situations. Additionally, 
targets were found to be more susceptible to the phenomenon of liking when they 
suffered social deprivation and marginalisation within their surrounding 
communities [18], [25], [3]. 
Also, commitment, reciprocation and consistency may be strongly connected to the 
varying types of duty an individual experiences (moral, religious, civic, etc.). Finally, 
distraction is created by forming an intense emotional response within the target, 
and therefore, relies heavily on the target’s emotional vulnerability. 
When the principles listed are implemented by an attacker, a gradual normalisation 
of extremist views may occur that could eventually lead to the radicalisation of the 
individual. The aim of this model is to help identify more specific and targeted 
intervention strategies by exploring the psychology of the targets of radicalisation 
and further understanding the motivation of the attackers. This proposed model 
will require thorough testing across varied radicalisation environments to inspect 
its accuracy and help develop a generalised radicalisation process. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The reviewed literature found that most researchers had widely assessed aspects of 
online radicalisation in isolation of the principles of social engineering that 
underpin any human interaction. On investigating the association between the 
Principles of Persuasion in Social Engineering (PPSE) and online radicalisation, 
strong elements of influence are exhibited in the behaviours of extremists online.  
 
This research has found that extremists exploit targets’ personality traits and 
emotions by utilising persuasion methods to increase the targets receptiveness to 
the attack. One of the most prominent features in the targets of online radicalisation 
attempts, is the sense of alienation from the surrounding society [3]. Extremists’ 
tactics of satisfying these individuals’ fundamental need for belonging through 
offering them positions within their group can be mapped directly onto the 
persuasion principle of liking. Other phenomena that aid extremists in 
indoctrinating individuals include group polarisation [18] and responsibility 
diffusion [9], both of which overlap with the persuasion principle of conformity or 
social proof.  
Figure 1. Preliminary radicalisation framework based on the PPSE  
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Whether the targets of these attempts to recruit extremists are mainly blameless 
victims in the attack, or if they are dangerous individuals that consciously decide to 
acquire ill-founded ideologies is a debatable topic. However, analysing the social 
engineering principles adopted by radicals online, may result in greater insight into 
the psychology of both the attackers and the targets as well as a deeper 
understanding of the online process itself. This understanding is crucial to pave the 
way for a more rounded prevention solution, that focuses on treating the target’s 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities to empower them to resist such attacks whilst 
raising awareness of the price of social deprivation within communities. Ultimately 
it looks at creating a framework to indicate where limited resources should be 
focused for developing much earlier interventions in the radicalisation process and 
deriving countermeasures against it. The framework introduced may also aid in the 
simplification of the complex phenomenon of radicalisation to gradually help the 
development of a generalised radicalisation process that may be applicable across 
several radicalisation environments.  
 
Furthermore, as the literature presented here focuses largely on the indoctrination 
of individuals into radical Islam, further research would be especially useful in at 
least two areas: the first being the application of the preliminary model presented 
in Figure 1 regarding other forms of extremisms, e.g. far right extremism; the 
second is the need to highlight which social engineering principles apply 
specifically to lone wolf terrorism, seeing as such terrorists act in support of a 
group without the direct reinforcement or instructions/grooming from such groups 
[27]. 
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